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LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILL 
ACCIDENTS: INTERNATIONAL REGIME AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION IN CHINA 
ABSTRACT 
Marine oil spill accidents have long been caused by ship 
collisions. However, the proliferation of offshore oil and gas 
installations portends a marked increase in oil spills from these 
sources. This presents a unique enforcement challenge for 
international and Chinese domestic systems for oil pollution 
liability and compensation that were developed in response to the 
threat of ship-based oil pollution. This article focuses on how the 
international liability and compensation regime for oil pollution 
has been implemented in China, and whether a combination of 
the international regime and domestic Chinese regulations could 
provide an adequate mechanism for holding offshore oil 
operators liable for accidents and for ensuring adequate 
compensation to injured parties. Analysis of Chinese law 
demonstrates that the current international liability and 
compensation regime for oil pollution, the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention (CLC)–International Oil Pollution Compensation 
(IOPC Funds), has been only partially implemented in China and 
lacks domestic adaptation mechanisms. The CLC–IOPC Funds 
regime also does not extend to oil pollution accidents resulting 
from offshore operations. An international convention containing 
universal liability provisions for offshore oil spill accidents 
would require a long-term process of joint international efforts. 
Based on this international and domestic Chinese legal 
environment, this article concludes that China should first 
develop a domestic liability and compensation mechanism that 
implements the international regime for ship-source oil pollution 
in its entirety, but which also extends to pollution caused by 
offshore oil spills. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, shipping accidents have been a major source of the world’s 
oil spills.1 This reality has significantly impacted the development of the current 
international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution through the 
efforts of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). 2  The regime is 
comprised of a series of conventions3 adopted pursuant to the IMO’s objective of 
keeping the shipping industry safe and clean. 4  Considered together, these 
conventions establish a liability and compensation framework for ship-source oil 
pollution, which was adopted and implemented by signatory states.5 However, in 
its current form, the regime does not extend to non-ship-source oil pollution, which 
poses a significant challenge both to assigning liability to offshore oil and gas 
operators and to compensating parties suffering damages as a result of pollution 
caused by offshore oil and gas operations. 
There have been several attempts by international and governmental 
agencies to establish a unified liability regime for pollution damage from offshore 
oil and gas operations. Due to disagreement over the definition of “ship,” early 
attempts comprised only exploratory discussions without establishing a unified 
regime.6 As offshore drilling increases and moves into deep waters, catastrophic 
 
 1. See Laura Moss, The 13 Largest Oil Spills in History, MOTHER NATURE NETWORK (July 16, 
2010), http://www.mnn.com/earth-matters/wilderness-resources/stories/the-13-largest-oil-spills-in-
history [https://perma.cc/3PS5-28VR]. 
 2. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the United Nations specialized agency with 
responsibility for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. 
Maritime safety was considered to be the IMO’s most important responsibility. In 1967, the Torrey 
Canyon accident occurred, with 120,000 tonnes of oil being spilled, which draw the IMO’s attention to 
the growth in the amount of oil being transported by sea and in the size of oil tankers. After that, a series 
measures were gradually designed to prevent and compensate tanker accidents, including the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 34 U.S.T. 3407, 
1340 U.N.T.S. 184, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 
1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45, and the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11 
I.L.M. 284. The latter two conventions originally established the international liability and 
compensation regime for oil pollution. See Brief History of IMO, INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org
/en/About/HistoryOfIMO/Pages/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/U7G2-7GAX]. 
 3. The majority of conventions adopted under the auspices of IMO or for which the Organization 
is otherwise responsible, fall into three main categories. The first group is concerned with maritime 
safety; the second with the prevention of marine pollution; and the third with liability and compensation, 
especially in relation to damage caused by pollution. Outside these major groupings are a number of 
other conventions dealing with facilitation, tonnage measurement, unlawful acts against shipping and 
salvage, etc. In the context of the liability and compensation regime for oil pollution, “a series of 
conventions” mainly refer to: the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
supra note 2; the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2; and the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, Mar. 27, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1493 (entered into force Nov. 21, 
2008), and the amendments of the three conventions. See Introduction to Conventions, INT’L MAR. 
ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/EFE3-9GAX]. 
 4. U.N. Convention on the International Maritime Organization art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 
6, 1948, 9 U.S.T. 621, 289 U.N.T.S. 48 (entered into force Mar. 17, 1958). 
 5. See Introduction to Conventions, supra note 3. 
 6. See infra Table 2, Part II.C. 
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accidents in offshore operations 7  are occurring more frequently and pose a 
significant global environmental and human health risk. Except for some private 
laws and regional agreements, few liability and compensatory rules universally 
apply to pollution damage from major offshore accidents, including marine 
transboundary pollution.8 
China, as a country that has long engaged in both shipping and offshore 
industries, has confronted frequent oil spill accidents in its territory, within the 
boundaries of its territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ),9 and continental 
shelves, as well as on the high seas. In the face of ship-source oil pollution, China 
has adopted and partially implemented a series of IMO Civil Liability and Fund 
conventions.10 The implemented conventions chiefly apply to persistent oil spills 
from tankers and bunker oil pollution damage in China. 
As a mechanism for compensating those adversely affected by oil 
pollution not covered by the IMO conventions in force in China, a domestic 
liability fund regime for oil pollution was established in 2015.11 However, this 
regime does not extend to oil pollution from offshore operations, and total domestic 
 
 7. For example, the 2009 Australia Montara oil spill; 2010 US Deepwater Horizon oil spill; 2011 
China Bohai Bay oil spill; and 2012 Brazil Frade oil spill. 
 8. One example here is the 1975 Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL), which is not an 
international convention but a private agreement between 16 operators in the offshore sector. This 
Agreement was initially an interim measure to provide a strict liability regime whilst awaiting the entry 
into force of a regional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage resulting from 
Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources (CLEE), a regional convention for the 
Baltic, North Sea, and North Atlantic areas. The Convention was, however, never ratified by any of the 
nine states that participated in the Diplomatic Conference which adopted the Convention and it has 
never come into force. However, OPOL continues to operate and imposes strict liability on operators of 
offshore facilities and guaranteed payment of compensation up to a limit currently set at US $ 250 
million per incident. The parties to OPOL are 16 operators of offshore facilities within the jurisdiction 
of any of the “Designated States” to the Agreement which are UK, Denmark, Germany, France, 
Republic of Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Isles of Man, Faroe Islands and Greenland. COMITÉ MAR. 
INT’L, OFFSHORE ACTIVITIES: POLLUTION LIABILITY AND RELATED ISSUES, http://www.comitemaritime
.org/Uploads/Work%20In%20Progress/Offshore%20Activities/Offshore%20activities-pollution%20and
%20related%20issues-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4NUU-CCHR]. 
 9. The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject 
to the specific legal regime established in Part V of the United Nations Conventions on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms 
of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention. The EEZ shall not extend 
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea, art. 56, 57, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 
(entered into force Nov. 16, 1994). 
 10. This mainly refers to Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability 
for Oil Pollution, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S. 255 (entered into force May 30, 1996) (amending 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3); 
Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, Nov. 27, 1992, 1953 U.N.T.S. 373, 35 I.L.M. 1406 
(entered into force May 30, 1996); International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 3. 
 11. Maritime Bureau, China Ship Oil Pollution Compensation Fund Management Committee was 
Established, NEWS OF THE MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (June 19, 
2015), http://www.moc.gov.cn/zizhan/zhishuJG/haishiju/guanlipindao/gongzuodongtai/201506/t201506
19_1837359.html [https://perma.cc/ES5K-2E45]. 
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compensable oil pollution damages are much lower than that under the 
international system.12 For offshore oil spill damages, there are only basic rules in 
China’s Marine Environmental Protection Law (MEPL)13 and Tort Law,14 which 
do not form a unified liability regime. As a result of these inadequate compensation 
criteria and holes in domestic law, mechanisms for compensating ship-source and 
offshore oil pollution are insufficient in China. 
The aim of this article is threefold. First, it examines the international 
regime on liability and compensation for oil spill accidents. This examination 
reveals a gap in the international regime, which lacks provisions addressing oil spill 
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas operations. Second, this article introduces 
the Chinese framework for liability and compensation for oil spill accidents. This 
discussion also addresses how the international liability and compensation regime 
for oil pollution has been implemented in China. Third, it further explores whether 
the implemented international regime and the Chinese system of oil pollution 
liability and compensation are applicable to offshore oil spill damages in China. 
In this respect, the article is structured as follows. Part I provides a 
historical overview of major oil spill accidents and discusses the nature of the 
damage caused by accidents in shipping and offshore industries. Part II reviews the 
international regime on liability and compensation for oil spill accidents, including 
the development of international law on ship-source oil pollution and the attempts 
to establish a unified convention for pollution from offshore operations. Part III 
analyzes the implementation of the international liability and compensation regime 
for oil spill accidents in China. In comparing criteria for oil pollution under 
Chinese law and international conventions, this section also discusses why China 
has not fully implemented the 1992 CLC–IOPC regime, and the increasing 
challenges arising from the legal gap in the Chinese system concerning assigning 
liability and providing compensation. The article concludes by arguing that China 
should endeavor to fully implement the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime, and 
proposing that a unified domestic liability-fund regime should be extended to the 
pollution damage caused by offshore oil spill accidents. 
I. OIL SPILL ACCIDENTS 
A. Overview 
“Oil spill accident” usually refers to unexpected and heavy releases of oil 
with the potential of causing significant economic loss, personal injury, or 
environmental damage.15 These accidents are chiefly caused by human activities 
(e.g., oil drilling, manufacturing, storage, transportation, and waste management) 
and come in conspicuous forms such as well blowouts, pipeline breaks, and ship 
 
 12. See infra Table 5, Part III.B. 
 13. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000). 
 14. Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 2009, effective July 1, 2010). 
 15. See Oil Spill Accidents, LAWS, http://accident.laws.com/oil-spills [https://perma.cc/3ZU3-
MD5C]. 
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collisions or groundings.16 Since the 1970s, numerous oil spill accidents have been 
recorded worldwide; they are less frequent than operational oil spills but involve a 
high percentage of total spilled volume.17 The recorded spills mostly occurred in 
marine transportation and offshore oil and gas operations, especially in cases where 
an oil tanker broke up in heavy seas or a disaster occurred at an offshore oil 
platform. 
B. Major Accidents in Shipping and Offshore Industries 
Over time, the source of oil spill accidents in the industry has shifted from 
shipping accidents to accidents occurring during offshore oil extraction and 
conveyance. 18  Ship-source oil spills account for a large amount of marine oil 
pollution between 1970 and 2010. However, the quantity of ship-source oil spilled 
per year during that same period has seen a reduction from 314,000 tons in 1970 to 
21,000 tons in 2000.19 This reduction may be closely related to the use of pipelines 
for transporting petroleum products,20 safer and structurally-improved tankers, and 
improved ship traffic control.21 In addition, whereas the number of pipeline spills 
per decade has increased dramatically since the 1970s, only a few very large 
offshore accidents—such as the Ixtoc I and Deepwater Horizon oil spills—account 
for a larger volume of oil spilled. Indeed, spillage figures for a particular year may 
be severely distorted by a single large accident.22 
Over the past decade, accidents on offshore oil platforms have led to 
dramatic pollution damage. However, except for widespread media coverage of 
four recent major offshore accidents (Australia, 2009; United States, 2010; China, 
2011; Brazil, 2012),23 worldwide sharing of information concerning the safety of 
offshore oil extraction operations is limited. As offshore oil and gas operations 
move from shallow coastal areas to deep waters (over 500 meters below sea level), 
poor information sharing undoubtedly breeds difficulties in remediating damaged 
areas when extreme accidents occur. In contrast, statistics for tanker accidents are 
available worldwide and comprehensively calculated each year. This service is 
offered by the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF)24 and 
 
 16. RISK GOVERNANCE OF OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS 1 (Preben Hempel Lindøe eds. 
2014). 
 17. Most spills from tankers result from routine operations such as loading, discharging, and 
bunkering which normally occur in ports or at oil terminals, while larger spills tend to result from 
accidental causes such as collisions and groundings. See INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N 
LTD., OIL TANKER SPILL STATISTICS 2015, at 2 (2016), http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents
/Company_Lit/Oil_Spill_Stats_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4XY-JL55]. 
 18. Arne Jernelöv, How to Defend Against Future Oil Spills, 466 NATURE 182, 183 (2010). 
 19. Id. at 182–183. 
 20. Michael A. de Gennaro, Oil Pollution Liability and Control Under International Maritime Law: 
Market Incentives as an Alternative to Government Regulation, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 265, 274 
(2004). 
 21. Jernelöv, supra note 18. 
 22. Id. at 183. 
 23. See supra note 7. 
 24. The International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation (ITOPF) was established in 1968 in the 
wake of the Torrey Canyon oil spill. Its original function was the administration of an oil spill 
compensation scheme. During the 1970s, ITOPF developed its technical services function and 
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provides a successful model for the development of a database for offshore 
accidents that a non-profit organization, like ITOPF and others interested in 
monitoring and evaluating offshore accidents, should work toward. 
C. Damage Caused by Oil Spill Accidents 
The damages suffered by those adversely affected by an oil spill include 
personal injury, property damage, economic loss, and environmental damage. The 
first three damages together are regarded as “traditional damage[s]”25 and usually 
trigger the application of international civil liability conventions. However, 
environmental damage, and particularly “pure environmental damage” or 
“ecological damage,” is seldom cited as the sole basis for liability.26 
For example, the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage defines “pollution damage” as: 
(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by contamination 
resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, 
wherever such escape or discharge may occur, provided that 
compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss 
of profit from such impairment shall be limited to costs of 
reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to 
be undertaken; 
(b) the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage 
caused by preventive measures.27 
This definition of oil pollution reflects the policy position of most oil spill 
liability treaties currently in force, i.e., to impose liability upon oil and gas 
operators for property and economic loss resulting in damage to the environment,28 
but not to impose liability for damage inflicted upon the environment per se. In 
particular, this definition is unsatisfactory because it does not state explicitly what 
types of damages are compensable under the convention. With respect to 
environmental damage, the compensable aspects are limited to removal of 
hazardous substances and “reinstatement” of the environment. It should also be 
noted that this definition does not contain a mechanism for compensation for 
unrecoverable damage to the environment itself. However, being the first of its 
 
established a team of well qualified scientists able to offer around the clock technical support to tanker 
owners, their P&I insurers and other groups. ITOPF has been providing its key service of emergency 
response to tanker owners since the 1970s. From 1999 this service was formally extended to the owners 
of other types of ship as well. See Our History, INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LIMITED, 
http://www.itopf.com/about-us/our-history/ [https://perma.cc/R9AW-QB9P]. 
 25. This definition occurs in the introduction to Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of April 21, 2004 on environmental liability with regard to the prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage. See Introduction, Environmental Liability, EUR. COMMISSION: 
ENV’T, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/liability/ [https://perma.cc/G3VF-HW9P]. 
 26. 6 ALENA DOUHAN, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIABILITY 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 830 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed. 2013). 
 27. Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285–86. 
 28. MICHAEL BOWMAN & ALAN BOYLE, ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW 156 (2002). 
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kind, this definition has substantially influenced the concept of environmental 
damage in most subsequent international liability regimes. 
In practice, the extent of damages resulting from a given oil spill depends 
on a wide range of factors, including the particular characteristics of the spill.29 
Compared with light oils, highly persistent oil—such as heavy fuel oil or heavy 
crude—is more likely to cause widespread damage in the intertidal zones of 
shorelines through smothering, which usually occurs in major oil spill accidents.30 
Therefore, both international and domestic liability regimes for oil pollution 
usually divide spilled oils into categories of persistent oil and non-persistent oil 
spills,31  and the compensation criteria for oil pollution damage are established 
based on the quantity of oil released in a given case. 
II. THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION FOR OIL ACCIDENTS 
A. Liability and Compensation for Ship-Source Oil Pollution 
Historically, ship-source oil spills have caused considerable amounts of 
damage; this reality stimulated the development of international conventions for 
governing and managing oil pollution. These conventions are focused in their scope 
and drafted to apply to spills based on the source of the spill and type of oil spilled 
in a given case (see Table 1 below). Together, these conventions aim to establish a 
unified liability regime and mechanisms for providing adequate compensation to 
parties affected by oil pollution. 













International Convention on the Establishment of an 





International Convention on Liability and Compensation 
for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous 










 29. See INT’L TANKER OWNERS POLLUTION FED’N LTD., EFFECTS OF OIL POLLUTION ON THE 
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: TECHNICAL INFORMATION PAPER 13 (2014), http://www.itopf.com/file
admin/data/Documents/TIPS%20TAPS/TIP13EffectsofOilPollutionontheMarineEnvironment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7MS3-QCSE]. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
 31. “[P]ersistent oils generally contain a considerable proportion of heavy fractions or high-boiling 
material such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil.” In contrast, “non-persistent oils 
are those that are generally of a volatile nature and are composed of lighter hydrocarbon fractions, 
which tend to dissipate rapidly through evaporation.” CARYN ANDERSON, INT’L TANKER OWNERS 
POLLUTION FED’N LTD., PERSISTENT VS NON-PERSISTENT OILS: WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1–2 
(2001), http://www.itopf.com/fileadmin/data/Documents/Papers/persistent.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y9Z9-
6J8C]. 
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The original liability and compensation regime for oil pollution is set forth 
in the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 
(CLC) 32  and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (1971 Fund).33 In 
1967, an accident involving the oil tanker Torrey Canyon caused 120,000 tonnes of 
crude oil to escape, causing major damage to the coastline and wildlife in the 
vicinity of Southern England and Northern France. 34  This accident led to the 
establishment of the 1969 CLC, which provided strict liability and compulsory 
insurance for “[oil] pollution damage.”35 After that, the 1971 Fund was created as 
an additional compensation mechanism for “pollution damage[s]” that exceed the 
liability limitation under the 1969 CLC. The ceiling for compensation thus reached 
60 million SDR36 (84 million USD in 2016 terms) per incident, which included the 
amount paid under the 1969 CLC.37 
In 1992, two protocols amended the old regime (the 1969 CLC–1971 
Funds regime), thus formulating the 1992 Civil Liability Convention (1992 CLC)38 
and the 1992 Fund Convention (1992 Fund). 39  The amended CLC and Fund 
convention established a new regime that, for all practical purposes, inherited the 
old liability and compensation framework for ship-source oil spills,40 but provided 
 
 32. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2. 
 33. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for 
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2. 
 34. See Brief History of IMO, supra note 2; see also Moss, supra note 1. 
 35. “‘Pollution damage’ means . . . loss or damage caused outside the ship carrying oil by 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur,” and includes “the costs of preventive measures and further loss or damage caused 
by preventive measures.” Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285–86. 
 36. “The Protocol of 1976, which entered into force in 1981, provided for the applicable unit of 
account used under the convention to be based on the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as used by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), replacing the ‘Poincaré franc,’ based on the ‘official’ value of gold, 
as the applicable unit of account.” International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 
INT’L MAR. ORG., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-(CLC).aspx [https://perma.cc/V9MJ-J9QP]. 
 37. The unit of currency in the CLC and its Fund Conventions is the Special Drawing Right (SDR) 
as defined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this article, to clearly compare the 
compensation standards between international conventions and Chinese legislations, the SDR has 
converted into U.S. dollars at the rate applicable on July 1, 2016 (1 SDR=US$1.395960). See SDR 
Valuation, INT’L MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx [https://
perma.cc/4RN9-CYET]. 
 38. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 10. 
 39. See Protocol of 1992 to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 10. 
 40. The 1969 CLC applied to any persistent oil such as crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil, 
lubricating oil, and whale oil, whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in bunkers of such a ship; 
whereas oil in the 1992 CLC means any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil (excluded whale oil), 
whether carried on board a ship as cargo or in the bunkers of such a ship. See International Convention 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973 U.N.T.S. at 5; see also Protocol of 1992 
to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, 1956 
U.N.T.S. at 285. 
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much higher limits of compensation.41 In 2003, a protocol to the 1992 Fund—the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol—was adopted that further increased the 
maximum potential compensation for a given spill. 42  Membership in the 
Supplementary Fund is optional and any member state of the 1992 Fund may join 
the Supplementary Fund.43 The 1992 Fund and the Supplementary Fund together 
constitute the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds), 
which gradually developed into two intergovernmental organizations providing 
compensation for oil pollution damages resulting from tanker spills of persistent 
oil.44 
Although the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds is a compensation regime for oil 
pollution resulting from tankers, this regime is limited in its scope, only covering 
pollution damage arising from spills of persistent oil from tankers. It does not 
provide compensation for other types of oil spills in maritime transportation, such 
as non-persistent oil (e.g. gasoline, light diesel oil, kerosene) or oils from other 
types of substances (e.g. chemicals, liquefied gases or noxious liquid substances), 
nor does it cover spills occurring during offshore extraction activities. In other 
words, when pollution damages derive from a source other than maritime transport 
or are not caused by persistent oil, the related accidents are not compensable 
through the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime. 
To address non-persistent oil spills, as well as spills involving other 
substances, the International Marine Organization (IMO) developed the 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001 
(Bunker Convention) 45  and the International Convention on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substance by Sea (HNS Convention).46 The Bunker Convention provides 
a framework for liability and compensation for bunker oil47 pollution caused by all 
categories of sea-going vessels other than oil tankers. It is closely modeled after the 
1992 CLC, which imposes upon ship owners strict, but limited, liability for 
 
 41. Article 6(1) of the 1992 CLC Protocol is amended as follows: a. the reference to “3 million 
units of account” shall read “4,510,000 units of account”; b. the reference to “420 units of account” shall 
read “631 units of account”; and c. the reference to “59.7 million units of account” shall read 
“89,770,000 units of account.” See Adoption of Amendments of the Limitation Amounts in the Protocol 
of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, Oct. 
18, 2000, IMO Doc. LEG 82/12, annex 2, at 2 [hereinafter Adoption of the Amendments of the 
Limitation Amounts]. 
 42. Protocol of 2003 to the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1992, May 16, 2003, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF 14/20 
(entered in force Mar. 3, 2005). 
 43. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR 
COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE: EXPLANATORY NOTE 6 (2015) http://www.iopcfunds.
org/fileadmin/IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/explanatory_note.pdf [https://perma.cc/E29P-CS3C] 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE]. 
 44. Id. 
 45. International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 3. 
 46. International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406. 
 47. “Bunker oil” means any hydrocarbon mineral oil, including lubricating oil, used or intended to 
be used for the operation or propulsion of the ship, and any residues of such oil. See International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 3, art. 1.5. 
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pollution damages. This strict liability provision is coupled with a compulsory 
insurance requirement provision establishing a claimant’s right of action against the 
insurer. The HNS Convention is also modeled after the 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund 
Convention, and was adopted in 1996 to complement the CLC–IOPC Fund regime 
by providing compensation to victims of accidents involving a wide range of 
hazardous and noxious substances, including bulk cargoes (solids, liquids including 
oils, and liquefied gases) and packaged goods.48 
B. The 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds Regime 
The 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime creates a three-tier system to 
effectively compensate for oil spill damages in shipping activities. Under this 
regime, the following compensatory damages are available to parties injured as a 
result of an oil spill: 
 
 cleanup costs and preventive measures; 
 property damage; 
 economic loss 
o to fisheries, mariculture, and fish processing sector, 
o in the tourism sector; 
 measures to prevent pure economic loss; as well as 
 environmental damage and post-spill studies.49 
 
Regardless of the flag state of the tanker and the nationality of the ship owner, the 
regime covers oil spills that occur in a member state’s territory, territorial sea, or 
EEZ or equivalent area.50 
The 1992 CLC is the first tier of compensation. It imposes strict liability 
on ship owners in the context of accidental oil spills whereby a ship owner is liable 
for pollution damage caused by its tanker regardless of fault.51 A ship owner is also 
entitled to liability limitation, based on gross ship tonnage,52  in the maximum 
amount of 89.77 million SDR (125.32 million USD). However, a ship owner will 
be deprived of this right to limited liability “if the damage resulted from the 
 
 48. See International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with 
the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, supra note 46, at 1415–16.  
 49. INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, 1992 FUND CLAIMS MANUAL: OCTOBER 2013 
EDITION 6, 24–40 (2013) http://studylib.net/doc/18511180/claims-manual [https://perma.cc/L966-
7EKR]. 
 50. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, supra note 43, at 
2. 
 51. There are a limited number of exceptions for strict liability, including where (a) the damage 
resulted from an act of war or a grave natural disaster; (b) the damage was wholly caused by sabotage 
by a third party; and (c) the damage was wholly authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational 
aids that the damage resulted from. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 2, 973 U.N.T.S. at 5. 
 52. Monetary limit of liability of 1992 CLC is based on ship gross tonnage (GT): ≦5000 GT, 4.51 
million SDR; 5,000–14,0000 GT, 4.51 million SDR plus 631 SDR for each GT; > 14,0000 GT, 89.77 
million SDR. The ship owner’s insurer will be entitled to the same limits as the ship owner. See 
Adoption of the Amendments of the Limitation Amounts, supra note 41; see also Protocol of 1992 to 
Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 287. 
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owner’s personal act with the intent to cause such loss or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result.”53 
In order to ensure that compensation claims against a ship owner are not 
frustrated by insolvency, the 1992 CLC also established compulsory insurance 
requirements. In particular, owners of ships registered in member states carrying 
more than 2000 tons of persistent oil as cargo must maintain insurance or other 
financial security to cover their liability for potential pollution damages.54 Similarly 
registered ships must carry a certificate on board attesting to the insurance 
coverage. These insurance certificates must also be carried aboard ships not 
registered in a member state but that navigate seas under the jurisdiction of a party 
to the 1992 CLC.55 In addition, claims for pollution damages under the 1992 CLC 
must be brought directly against a registered ship owner, the insurer, or other 
person providing financial security for the owner’s pollution damage liability.56 
The second tier of protection provided by the 1992 Fund is triggered when 
a state party victim does not obtain sufficient compensation under the 1992 CLC 
for one of the following reasons:57 
 
 the ship owner is 
o exempt under the 1992 CLC because it can invoke one of the 
exemptions under that convention,58 or 
o financially incapable of meeting its obligations under the 1992 
CLC in full and its insurance is insufficient to satisfy the claims 
for compensation; or 
 the damage exceeds the ship owner’s maximum liability under the 1992 
CLC. 
 
The 1992 Fund complements the 1992 CLC, and also regulates the limited 
circumstances in which the Fund is not triggered (for example, where the pollution 
 
 53. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 10, at 287–88. 
 54. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973 
U.N.T.S. at 7; see also Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 289. 
 55. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973 
U.N.T.S. at 7; see also Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 10, at 289. 
 56. INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR COMPENSATION FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, supra note 43, at 
10. 
 57. Id. at 23. 
 58. See International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 973 
U.N.T.S. at 5. 
No liability for oil pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the 
damage: (a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural 
phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or (b) was wholly 
caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third part, or (c) 
was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or 
other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in 
the exercise of that function. 
Id. 
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damage “resulted from an act of war,”59 or where the claimant “cannot prove that 
the pollution damage resulted from an incident involving one or more ships, as 
defined in the Convention”60). In terms of liability limitations, the 1992 Fund 
currently offers up to 203 million SDR (283 million USD) in coverage for each oil 
spill incident, which includes any compensation actually paid by or on behalf of a 
ship owner under the 1992 CLC.61 The 1992 Fund is supported by contributions 
from member state private parties who annually receive more than 150,000 metric 
tons (mt) of “contributing oil.”62 This means accession to the 1992 Fund may be 
associated with certain financial burdens. Thus, for the states whose “contributing 
oil” is less than 150,000 mt, accession to the 1992 Fund, it “would appear only 
advantageous and, therefore, highly advisable.”63 
The 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol offers a third tier of compensation 
in cases where the protection afforded under the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund 
Convention is insufficient. The maximum amount of compensation available under 
the 2003 Supplementary Fund is 750 million SDR (1.04 billion USD), which 
includes any compensation paid under the 1992 CLC and the 1992 Fund. Similar to 
the 1992 Fund, the 2003 Supplementary Fund is also financed by member state “oil 
receivers,” but only those from member states deemed to have received at least 1 
million mt of “contributing oil” per year.64 Since no accident has yet occurred and 
been compensated by the Supplementary Fund, only a small amount of 
administrative expense is currently levied on the member states of the 
Supplementary Fund. Accordingly, the Supplementary Fund can guarantee 
claimants sufficient compensation in the case of catastrophic oil spills, and 
 
 59. Id. 
 60. 1 U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR SHIP-SOURCE OIL 
POLLUTION: AN OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE 
FROM TANKERS 16 (2012), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/dtltlb20114_en.pdf [https://perma.
cc/L8M5-SCEV]. 
 61. See INT’L OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL 
POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CIVIL LIABILITY CONVENTION, THE 1992 FUND CONVENTION 
AND THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUND PROTOCOL 3, 24 (2011), http://www.iopcfunds.org/fileadmin/
IOPC_Upload/Downloads/English/Text_of_Conventions_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/A99L-S3QD]. 
 62. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 1971, supra note 10, 1953 U.N.T.S. at 
377. 
(3) ‘Contributing oil’ means crude oil and fuel oil as defined . . . below: 
(a) ‘Crude Oil’ means any liquid hydrocarbon mixture occurring naturally in the earth 
whether or not treated to render it suitable for transportation. It also includes crude 
oils from which certain distillate fractions have been removed (sometimes referred to 
as ‘topped crudes’) or to which certain distillate fractions have been added 
(sometimes referred to as ‘spiked’ or ‘reconstituted’ crudes). 
(b) ‘Fuel Oil’ means heavy distillates or residues from crude oil or blends of such 
materials intended for use as a fuel for the production of heat or power of a quality 
equivalent to the ‘American Society for Testing and Materials’ Specification for 
Number Four Fuel Oil (Designation D 396-69)’, or heavier. 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage, supra note 2, 1110 U.N.T.S. at 60. 
 63. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., supra note 60, at 28. 
 64. Id. at 18. 
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widespread adoption of the Supplementary Fund may reduce the financial burden 
on each member state. 
C. Liability and Compensation for Pollution from Offshore Operations 
Although the 1992 CLC–IOPC regime offers a model of compensating oil 
pollution, it does not apply to pollution from offshore oil and gas operations. Other 
international conventions on liability and compensation for ship-source oil 
pollution also do not cover oil spills in offshore extractive activities; offshore 
accidents usually occur on offshore installations65 that are not generally considered 
“ships” by definition. Only some offshore installations would be treated as ships, 
but there is no uniform rule for the legal status of these installations under 
international law.66 
Practically speaking, the term “ship” is defined differently in various 
international conventions with different purposes. 67  Some conventions, like the 
1992 CLC and its Fund, provide the explicit criterion that a “ship” must have the 
capacity to navigate at sea.68  Accordingly, only those mobile installations that 
 
 65. See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, May 1, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1451. 
“Installation” means (a) any well or other facility, whether fixed or mobile, which is 
used for the purpose of exploring for, producing, treating, storing, transmitting or 
regaining control of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil; (b) any well 
which has been used for the purpose of exploring for, producing or regaining control 
of the flow of crude oil from the seabed or its subsoil and which has been abandoned 
after the entry into force of this Convention for the Controlling State concerned; (c) 
any well which is used for the purpose of exploring for, producing or regaining 
control of the flow of gas or natural gas liquids from the seabed or its subsoil during 
the period that any such well is being drilled, including completion, or worked upon 
except for normal maintenance operations; (d) any well which is used for the purpose 
of exploring for any mineral resources other than crude oil, gas or natural gas liquids, 
where such exploration involves the deep penetration of the subsoil of the seabed; and 
(e) any facility which is normally used for storing crude oil from the seabed or its 
subsoil; which, or a substantial part of which, is located seaward of the low-water line 
along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the 
Controlling State; provided, however, that (i) where a well or a number of wells is 
directly connected to a platform or similar facility, the well or wells together with 
such platform or facility shall constitute one installation; and (ii) a ship as defined in 
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done at 
Brussels on 29 November 1969 shall not be considered to be an installation. 
Id. 
 66. Mikhail Kashubsky, Protecting Offshore Oil and Gas Installations: Security Threats and 




 67. Rosalie Balkin, Is There a Place for the Regulation of Offshore Oil Platforms Within 
International Maritime Law? If Not, Then Where?, DUBLIN SYMP. (2013) (presented Sept. 30, 2013). 
 68. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, supra note 10, 1956 U.N.T.S. at 285. 
“Ship” means any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type whatsoever 
constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship 
capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as ship only when it is 
actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage 
unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. 
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“have [their] own independent motive power and steering equipment for seagoing 
navigation, and are employed either as storage units or for carriage of oil in bulk as 
cargo,” would be classified as ships under the CLC–Funds definitions.69 Others 
such as the Bunker Convention and the HNS Convention define “ship” simply as 
“any seagoing vessel and seaborne craft, of any type whatsoever.” Although this 
definition could potentially be interpreted broadly enough to cover both mobile and 
fixed oil installations, and thereby trigger a duty to obtain insurance for those 
installations,70 it remains difficult to apply the compensation mechanism for ship-
source oil spills to offshore oil spills based on the distinct characteristics of 
offshore installations and ships. In practice, there have been no offshore installation 
oil spills compensated under the IMO Civil Liability and Fund conventions. 
Although a series of international legal practices for oil pollution in 
offshore extractive activities have developed since the 1970s, few conventions 
effectively establish an international liability and compensation regime for offshore 
oil accidents (see Table 2 below). Due to different levels of development in the 
offshore oil and gas industry around the world, as well as different interests among 
countries, regulations applicable to offshore accidents tend to come in the form of 
contracts or regional agreements. Although they serve an important function in 
promoting and ensuring regional offshore oil and gas safety, it is not ideal to have 
different legal regimes for individual countries. For example, under different 
regimes, offshore installations could fall under the definition of “ships” in one 
jurisdiction and “independent drilling units” in another; and the ceiling for an 
offshore installation operator’s liability for accidental spills may be limited in one 
country and unlimited in another. As a result, unification of definitions and legal 
mechanisms must be addressed “before the various regions of the world develop 

















 69. Balkin, supra note 67. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Edgar Gold, Pollution from Offshore Activities-An Overview of the Operational, Legal and 
Environmental Aspects, in LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT 203–232, 224 
(Colin M. De La Rue ed. 1993). 
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TABLE 2. Legal practices on international convention for oil pollution in offshore extractive 
activities 
 





The OPOL is a private agreement initially applied to offshore 
facilities72 within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, but has 
subsequently been extended to apply to such facilities within the 
jurisdiction of other countries as well.73 It covers oil discharges 
from offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of any state that is 
specified in OPOL, and participating states now require applicants 
for offshore exploration, exploitation, and pipe-laying licenses to be 
a party to OPOL.74 In terms of compensation, the OPOL 
establishes a current maximum of 250 million USD per incident, 
subject to a few exceptions, for pollution damage and the cost of 
remedial measures incurred.75 Each operator should accept strict 
liability. 
Convention on Civil 
Liability for Pollution 
Damage Resulting 
from Exploration for 




The CLEE was an attempt at establishing a separate liability 
regime for the offshore oil and gas industry. It provides detailed 
rules concerning the standards of liability (strict or fault), limitations 
of liability (limited or unlimited), and jurisdiction,76 referring to 
“installations” that covers all fixed or mobile units, storage 
installations and most pipelines.77 Unfortunately, this instrument 
has never achieved the necessary ratifications for entry into 
force,78 but offers a useful model on liability for offshore oil 
pollution to study and optimize. 
 
 72. OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N LTD., OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIABILITY AGREEMENT 2 
(2016), http://www.opol.org.uk/downloads/OPOL_Agreement%20-%201_April_2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/CGX3-FH5K] 
“Offshore facility” means (a) any well and any installation or pipeline or portion 
thereof of any kind, fixed or mobile, being used for the purpose of exploring for, 
producing, treating, storing or transporting Oil from the seabed or its subsoil; (b) any 
well used for the purpose of exploring for or recovering gas or natural gas liquids 
from the seabed or its subsoil during the period that any such well is being drilled 
(including completion), re-completed or worked upon (except for normal work-over 
operations); or (c) any installation of any kind, fixed or mobile, intended for the 
purpose of exploring for, producing, treating or storing Oil from the seabed or its 
subsoil where such installation has been temporarily removed from its operational site 
for whatever reason. 
Id. 
      73. See The Offshore Pollution Liability Agreement (OPOL), OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N 
LTD. 2 (2016), http://www.opol.org.uk/about-1.htm [https://perma.cc/5BRN-R9GJ]. Until July 1, 2016, 
the OPOL applied to the offshore facilities in Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the 
Republic of Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, the Isle of Man, the Faroe Islands, and Greenland, but 
excluding such facilities located in the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas. It can be extended to apply to 
offshore facilities within the jurisdiction of any other state. Id. 
74.  See OFFSHORE POLLUTION LIAB. ASS’N LTD., supra note 72, at 6. 
75. Offshore Pollution Liab. Ass’n Ltd., OPOL: Guidelines for Claimants, http://www.opol.org.uk/
downloads/opol-guidelines-oct10.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V4V-JUU8]. 
76.  Gold, supra note 71, at 221. 
77.  See Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, supra note 65. 
78.  Richard Shaw, Regulation of Offshore Activity-Pollution Liability and Other Aspects, in 
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, YEARBOOK 2011–2012 ANNUAIRE: BEIJING I DOCUMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE 
302 (2012).  
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The CMI draft convention, also known as the Rio Draft, constituted 
a model of incorporation by reference,80 but initially could not form 
“a practical regime suitable for offshore units.”81 The convention 
was later revised in 1994, then accepted by the CMI. 82, This 
instrument became known as the Sydney Draft. Notwithstanding 
the creation of the Sydney Draft,83 the International Association of 
Drilling Contractors and the United States Maritime Law 
Association insisted that a comprehensive international treaty for 
oil installations was not necessary.84 This led to the striking of 
Sydney Draft from the IMO long-term working plan. However, 
although establishment of an international convention for offshore 
installations had been officially ceased, a CMI working group and 
the Canadian Maritime Law Association developed the Draft 
Convention on Offshore Units, Artificial Islands and Related 
Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of 
Petroleum and Seabed Mineral Resources 2001, i.e., the 
Canadian Draft, which provides for comprehensive coverage for of 
oil installations, including “property, registration, privileges, 
mortgages, civil and penal jurisdiction to salvage, pollution and 
liability for leakage.”85 At the 2004 CMI Conference in Vancouver, 
this draft convention received overall support despite continued 
strong opposition from the United States; and participants of the 
conference agreed to continue to work towards improving this 
instrument.86 
 
79. Comité Maritime International, Draft International Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft, in 
COMITÉ MAR. INT’L, HANDBOOK OF MARITIME CONVENTIONS (2004), http://www.gbv.de/dms/spk/sbb/
toc/390092681.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF5E-UP8A]. The CMI 1977 Draft Convention on Offshore 
Mobile Craft (the Rio draft), not in force. 
80. Among the problems sought to be addressed by the original Rio Draft were unclear definitions 
of the term “ship” and disordered practices in applying the term to “offshore units”. See Michael White, 
Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International Convention, 18 AUSTL. MINING & 
PETROLEUM L.J. 21, 22 (1999). 
81. Canadian Mar. Law Ass’n, The Origins of the CMLA Draft Convention on Offshore Units, 
Artificial Islands and Related Structures Used in the Exploration for and Exploitation of Petroleum and 
Seabed Mineral Resources, CMI NEWS LETTER (Comité Maritime International), Jan./Apr. 2004, at 1, 2, 
http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binder1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMM8-
SX64].  
82. Article 1 of the Comité Maritime International (CMI) Constitution provides that the CMI “is a 
non-governmental not-for-profit international organization established in Antwerp in 1897, the object of 
which is to contribute by all appropriate means and activities to the unification of maritime law in all its 
aspects.” 
83. Comité Maritime International, Draft Convention on Off-Shore Mobile Craft (1994), reprinted 
in 1994 CMI Y.B. 180, http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/1994%20YEARBOOK-
ANNUAIRE%20SYDNEY%20II.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6ZW-XYZ8]. 
84. Jacqueline Allen, A Global Oil Stain – Cleaning Up International Conventions for Liability and 
Compensation for Oil Exploration/Production, 25 AUSTL. & N.Z. MAR. L.J. 90, 91 (2011). 
85. Iberoamerican Institute of Maritime Law, Position Paper of the Iberoamerican Institute of 
Maritime Law in Relation to the Need of an International Convention on the Offshore Extractive 
Activity Promoted by the IMO, Agenda Item 11 of the 102nd Session of the CMI Legal Committee (Apr. 
14, 2015) [hereinafter Position Paper], reprinted in 2015 CMI Y.B. 184, 186 http://www.comite
maritime.org/Uploads/Yearbooks/CMI_Yearbook_2015%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFK-TFKL]. 
86.  Allen, supra note 84, at 91.  
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UN Law of the Sea 
Convention, 198287 
The UNCLOS provides a fruitful framework for future development, 
rather than an operational treaty on liability and compensation for 
offshore oil spill damages.88 In particular, article 194(3) calls upon 
member states to take measures to minimize the “pollution from 
installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of the 
natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular 
measures for preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, 
ensuring the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, 
construction, equipment, operation and manning of such 
installations or devices.” Article 208 additionally encourages 
member states to “cooperate in the implementation of existing 
international law and further development of international law 
relating to responsibility and liability for the assessment of and 
compensation for damage and the settlement of related disputes.”  
 
In effect, liability and compensation for offshore oil accidents are not 
strictly legal problems, but also relate to a political issue: “[s]tates do not [wish to 
relinquish] their sovereignty over [c]ontinental [s]helves and [EEZs] and resist 
[subscribing] to an international convention [regarding those offshore extraction 
activities because] they understand [international law] may limit [their] 
jurisdictional [authority].”89 However, as the risk of offshore oil spill accidents 
increases, a unified international regime is likely to be the most effective method 
for providing adequate and fair compensation for oil pollution damages of member 
states. One reason for this is that offshore oil and gas facilities are usually operated 
by multinational corporations, a situation which presents complications in stating 
claims for compensation when oil spill accidents occur. For example, in developing 
countries, ineffectively structured international and national regulations not only 
aggravate damages for victims in the event of an oil spill accident, but also allow 
multinational oil and gas corporations to profit without taking responsibility for oil 
pollution. Another reason an international regime is necessary is that offshore 
accidents can easily cause transboundary pollution; and without a unified liability 
and compensation regime, applicable laws may conflict inter se involved states. 
Furthermore, with offshore extractive industries expanding their activities to the 
high seas and polar areas, international regulations will be of particular importance 
in preventing and controlling the potential risks of offshore oil accidents in those 
common areas of the world not within any one country’s exclusive jurisdiction. All 
these considerations together demonstrate that an international convention 
addressing offshore extractive activities should be promoted and introduced to the 
IMO’s agenda. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY AND 
COMPENSATION REGIME FOR OIL SPILL ACCIDENTS IN CHINA 
Worldwide, coastal states may be divided into three categories based on 
the compensation regimes they have adopted in the face of marine oil pollution. In 
the first category are the majority of coastal states, which have fully adopted the 
1992 CLC–IOPC funds regime, South Korea and Japan being notable examples. 
 
87.  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 9. 
88.  Gold, supra note 71, at 224. 
 89. Position Paper, supra note 85, at 9. 
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These states deal with oil spill accidents based on international conventions without 
regard to whether the accidents involve domestic or non-domestic tankers. The 
second category includes states that fully rely on domestic law, without taking part 
in any international convention. 90  For instance, the United States applies a 
unilateral approach to the compensation for oil pollution. Compared with the 1992 
CLC–IOPC funds regime, the United States’ regime provides substantially 
unlimited liability, and recognizes broader compensation for natural resources 
damages.91 States in the third category adopt a regime combining international and 
domestic legal frameworks, such as Canada and China. Under this approach, 
international conventions and domestic regulations are likely to complement each 
other, which accords with the rule of the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS): 
States shall ensure that recourse is available in accordance with 
their legal systems for prompt and adequate compensation or 
other relief in respect of damage caused by pollution of the 
marine environment by natural or juridical persons under their 
jurisdiction.92 
A. Overview of the Chinese Regime on Liability and Compensation for Oil 
Pollution 
Presently, the Chinese regime concerning liability and compensation for 
oil pollution adopts the double mechanism approach. On one hand, China has fully 
acceded to the 1992 CLC and the Bunker Convention, but only applied the 1992 
Fund to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. According to the general 
principles of Chinese law (see Table 3 below), international treaties are applied 
with priority when they contain provisions that differ from domestic regulations.93 
On the other hand, a domestic liability fund regime can be applied to ship-source 
oil pollution when the pollution damage cannot be compensated under the 
international regime. China has also selectively assimilated certain rules of CLC–
IOPC Funds into its domestic liability-fund regime, but the compensation criteria is 
far lower than the criteria established in the CLC–IOPC Funds regime. In terms of 
oil pollution from offshore operations, China has neither adopted an international 
convention nor enacted domestic legislation that would create a unified liability 
and compensation system. Some Chinese laws, such as the Marine Environmental 
Protection Law and Tort Law, provide fundamental principles on liability and 
compensation for oil pollution, which can apply to offshore oil spill damage, but 
 
 90. Peng Zhang et al., Compensation for the Damages Arising from Oil Spill Incidents: Legislation 
Infrastructure and Characteristics of the Chinese Regime, 140 ESTUARINE, COASTAL & SHELF SCI. 76, 
77 (2014). 
 91. See Inho Kim, A Comparison Between the International and US Regimes Regulating Oil 
Pollution Liability and Compensation, 27 MARINE POL’Y 265, 271 (2003). 
 92. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 9, at 494. 
 93. See General Principles of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the 
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress; Aug. 12, 1986, amended on Aug. 27, 2009), 
art. 142, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=2780 [https://perma.cc/7FV3-
9QE5]. 
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these principles are too general to explicitly direct liability to responsible parties.94 
As a result, adjudication of compensation for offshore oil spill accidents occurs 
mainly through administrative mediation in China. 
 





General legal principles 
related to the liability and 
compensation for oil 
pollution 
2014 Environmental Protection Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (EPL) 
2013 Marine Environmental Protection Law of the 
People’s Republic of China (MEPL) 
 2009 Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China 
 2009 General Principles Of the Civil Law of the People’s 
Republic Of China  
Special laws related to 
the liability and 
compensation for ship-
source oil spills 
2013 Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the 
Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance for 
Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (Insurance 
Implementation Measures) 
 2012 Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the 
Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use 
of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil 
Pollution Damage 
 2012 Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use 
of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil 
Pollution Damage 
 2011 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on 
Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of 
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced 
Oil Pollution Damage (the 2011 Judicial 
Interpretation) 
 2010 Administrative Provisions of the People’s Republic 
of China on the Prevention and Control of Marine 
Environmental Pollution by Vessels and Their 
Operations 
 2009 Regulation on the Prevention and Control of 
Vessel-induced Pollution to the Marine 
Environment (Prevention Regulation) 
 1992 Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China 
Special laws related to 
the liability and 
compensation for 
offshore oil spills 
2017 
 
Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Administration of Environmental Protection for 
Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation  
2016 
 
Measures for the Implementation of the Regulation 
of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Administration of Environmental Protection for 
Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation  
 
2011 Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on 
the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources 
in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises  
 
 94. See Michael G. Faure & Liu Jing, Compensation for Environmental Damage in China: Theory 
and Practice, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 226, 304 (2014). 
 95. The year of the latest revision of the laws and regulations. 
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B. Implementation of the International Liability Regime for Ship-source Oil 
Pollution in China 
As a signatory of the 1992 CLC and Bunker Convention, China has 
confirmed the applicability of the 1992 CLC to persistent oil spill accidents caused 
by tankers as long as the pollution damages occur within China’s territory and 
EEZs.96 Meanwhile, non-persistent oil spills caused by oil tankers or oil spills 
caused by non-oil tankers are to be settled according to the Maritime Law.97 Since 
the Bunker Convention does not have an independent limitation of liability or 
exclusive funds available to compensate bunker oil pollutions, the Chinese liability 
regime incorporated rules from the Bunker Convention into its domestic 
regulations for bunker oil pollutions (see Table 4 below). According to Article 5 of 
the 2011 Judicial Interpretation: 
If oil pollution damage is done due to the persistent oil carried by 
oil tankers, the limits of liability shall be determined according to 
the Regulation on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-induced 
Pollution to the Marine Environment and the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992). 
 
If oil pollution damage is caused by non-persistent bunker oil 
carried by oil tankers or by bunker oil carried by vessels other 
than oil tankers, the limits of liability shall be determined 
according to the provisions of the Maritime Law on the limits of 
liability for maritime claims.98 
TABLE 4. Applicable law for different types of oil pollution in China 
Ships Types Oil  Pollution Applicable Law 







Persistent oil as cargo  1992 CLC  1992 CLC 
Persistent bunker oil  1992 CLC 1992 CLC 












Persistent oil as cargo --- --- 
Persistent bunker oil  Bunker Convention Maritime Law 





Non-persistent bunker oil Bunker Convention Maritime Law 
 
 96. The territory includes the territorial sea. See Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969, supra note 10, at art. 3. 
 97. See Maritime Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the 28th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress, Nov. 7, 1992, in force July 1, 1993), 
art. 208.2, http://www.lawinfochina.com/Display.aspx?lib=law&Cgid=6023 [https://perma.cc/WS5G-
B63D]. 
 98. Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of 
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the 1509th 
meeting of the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., May 4, 2011, in force July 1, 2011), art. 5. 
Summer 2017 LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILLS 485 
Similar to the 1992 CLC, China’s Maritime Law also adopts a strict 
liability principle, exempting only damages resulting “from war, natural disaster, 
the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational aids, 
and either the sabotage or wrongful acts of the third party.”99 The limitation of 
liability is also established according to the gross tonnage of the ship, and is 
divided into the categories of personal injury compensation and non-personal injury 
compensation (see Table 5 below).100 Notably, domestic limitation of liability for 
oil pollution established by the Maritime Law is significantly lower than that of the 
1992 CLC. As a result, for those non-persistent bunker oil spills or bunker oil spills 
caused by non-oil tankers in China, domestic limitation of liability insufficiently 
compensates economic loss as well as environmental damage, and urgently needs 
improvement via amendment to the Maritime Law. 
Further, to guarantee the financial security of ship owners, China has 
established a compulsory insurance system (see Table 5 below). The system, 
together with liability rules, constitutes the first tier of compensation for oil 
pollution. According to Insurance Implementation Measures, 
for the vessels carrying oil substances and vessels carrying non-
oil substances with a gross tonnage of not less than 1,000 gross 
tons which are navigating within the sea areas of the People’s 
Republic of China, the owners thereof shall buy civil liability 
insurance for vessel-induced oil pollution damage or obtain 
corresponding financial guarantee in accordance with these 
Measures.101 
Consistent with the Prevention Regulation, this rule confirms the 
insurance requirement for owners for three types of ships: those carrying as bulk 
cargo either (1) persistent or (2) non-persistent oil, or (3) more than 1,000 gross 
tons of non-oil substances.102 Compared with the 2,000 ton persistent oil carriage 
requirement under the 1992 CLC, China’s domestic oil pollution insurance 
provision actually provides a stricter standard for the shipping industry. 
Furthermore, the domestic minimum insurance is set at no less than the insurance 
criteria for oil pollution in the Maritime Law and the 1992 CLC, respectively.103 
This high standard insurance may increase the cost of shipping, but in the long term 
it will tend to eliminate ineffectively managed oil ships and reduce the risks of 
ship-source oil pollution. 
 
 
 99. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-Induced 
Marine Environment Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 9, 
2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 51. 
 100. Peng Zhang et al., supra note 90, at 78. 
 101. Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance 
for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of China, 
Aug. 19, 2010, amended on Aug. 31, 2013, in force Aug. 31, 2013), at art. 2. 
 102. Id. at art. 4. 
 103. Compare id. at arts. 5, 6 with Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, art. 6, supra note 10, at 285–86. 
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TABLE 5. Liability limitation comparison between the 1992 CLC-IOPC Funds regime and 
the Chinese regime 
Tier 1992 CLC-Funds Regime Chinese Regime 
First Injury Personal Injury 
 (a) ≦ 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR 20–21 GT, 54000 SDR 
 (b) 5000—140000 GT, 4.51 
million SDR plus 
> 21 GT, 54000 SDR plus 1000 SDR for 
each GT 
 (c) > 140000 GT, 89.77 million 
SDR 
300–500 GT, 333000 SDR 
  501–3000 GT, 333000 SDR plus 500 SDR 
for each GT 
  3001–30000 GT, SDR3000 GT plus 333 SDR 
for each GT 
  30001–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 250 
SDR for each GT 
  > 70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 167 SDR 
for each GT 
 
  Non-personal injury 
  20–21 GT 27500 SDR; 21–300 GT, 27500 
SDR plus 500 SDR for each GT 
  300–500 GT, 167000 SDR for each GT 
  501–30000 GT, 167000 SDR 167 SDR for 
each GT 
  30000–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 125 
SDR for each GT 
  70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 83 SDR for 
each GT 
 Insurance Insurance 
 For ships carrying more than 
2000 tonnes of oil as cargo in 
bulk, the shipowner is obliged to 
maintain insurance to cover his 
liability under the 1992 CLC, and 
claimants have a right of direct 
action against the insurer.
104, 
Vessels carrying persistent oil substances: 
 ≦ 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR 
 > 5000 GT, 4.51 million SDR plus 631 
SDR for each GT, no more than 89.77 
million SDR 
  
  Vessels carrying non-persistent oil 
substances: 
  20–21 GT 27500 SDR 
  21–300 GT, 27500 SDR plus 500 SDR for 
each GT 
  300–500 GT, 167000 SDR for each GT 
  501–30000 GT, 167000 SDR 167 SDR for 
each GT 
  30000–70000 GT, SDR30000 GT plus 125 
SDR for each GT 
  > 70000 GT, SDR70000 GT plus 83 SDR 
for each GT 
 
104. Legal Framework of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, INT’L OIL POLLUTION FUNDS [IOPC 
FUNDS], http://www.iopcfunds.org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-civil-liability-convention/ [https://
perma.cc/R75J-5S5U]. 
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Second 203 million SDR 30 million CNY (3.4 million SDR)
 105
 
Third 750 million SDR --- 
 
C. The Implementation of the IOPC Funds and its Challenges in China 
Taking into consideration the heavy contributions levied by the IOPC 
Funds and the limited financial ability of domestic ship owners, China has now 
adopted the 1992 Funds only in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. As 
China has become the largest global net importer of crude oil in recent years,106 the 
risk of spills in its oil shipping has also necessarily increased. As potential loss 
magnitude of losses rises along with this increased risk, China should fully accept 
the international Funds for oil pollution to assure sufficient compensation in the 
event an oil spill accident occurs. 
Nonetheless, many oil ships in China operate in marginal situations, from 
the standpoint of the current compensation regime. For example, some ships that 
transport less than 1,000 gross tons of oil do not have oil spill insurance and 
operate in a grey area in terms of potential liability as these ships cannot apply the 
Insurance Implementation Measures. 107  Other Chinese ships are designed with 
single-layer hulls, which are more likely than double-layer hulls to leak oil in low-
impact collisions and groundings. These factors illustrate that a significant portion 
of the Chinese shipping industry currently cannot afford the contributions required 
by the IOPC Funds and thus needs reform. 
While a domestic fund for compensating ship-source oil pollution has 
been created as a second tier of compensation in China, since 1999, the Marine 
Environment Protection Law (MEPL) 108  has provided the legal authority for 
establishing such a fund. The law states: 
[t]he State shall perfect and put into practice the civil liability 
system of compensation for vessel-induced oil pollution, and 
shall establish a fund system for vessel-induced oil pollution 
insurance and oil pollution compensation based on the principle 
 
105. The 1992 Funds Convention applies to Hong Kong. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Ref. 
B1/D/3.03 IFC.4/Circ.34, Accession by China to the Protocol of 1992 to Amend the International 
Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, 
1971 (Jan. 14, 1999) (noting China’s declaration that the Protocol would “be applicable only to the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region”). 
 106. See Candace Dunn, China is Now the World’s Largest Net Importer of Petroleum and Other 
Liquid Fuels, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
php?id=15531 [https://perma.cc/JMK9-Y3PG] 
 107. Measures of the People’s Republic of China for the Implementation of Civil Liability Insurance 
for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic 
of China, Aug. 19, 2010, rev’d Aug. 31, 2013, effective Aug. 31, 2013), art. 2. 
 108. See supra note 13. 
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of the vessel and cargo owners jointly undertaking the risks of 
any vessel-induced oil pollution compensation liability.109 
In 2010, the Prevention Regulation also proposed a basic framework for 
such a domestic compensation fund, providing that the fund would be operated by 
the government and oil receivers. 110  Accordingly, China issued Administrative 
Measures111 in 2012 which, together with Detailed Rules,112 provide guidance for 
the fund levy. Finally, in June 2015, a Fund Management Committee 113  was 
established to administer the compensation mechanism for vessel-induced oil 
pollution.114 Responsible for decision-making, the Fund Executive Committee is 
comprised of nine relevant government agencies. 115  A Claim Affairs Center 
independently enforces the Committee’s compensation decisions. 
Similar to the IOPC Funds, the domestic fund was also established with 
the purpose of providing additional compensation for ship-source oil spill damage, 
while balancing the financial burden between Chinese ship owners and oil 
receivers. The provisions of the Administrative Measures are nearly identical their 
IOPC Funds counterparts. While the domestic fund provides compensation for 
ship-source oil pollution, its first priority is covering emergency disposal of oil 
pollution, 116  which is not reflected in the 1992 CLC–IOPC Funds regime. 
According to the Administrative Measures, the Fund Executive Committee levies 
 
 109. Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), art. 
66. 
 110. Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Vessel-Induced 
Marine Environment Pollution (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 9, 
2009, effective Mar. 1, 2010), art. 56. 
 111. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-
Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the 
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012). 
 112. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Administrative Measures for the Collection and 
Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of 
Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic of China, Apr. 16, 2014, effective Apr. 16, 
2014). 
 113. The Executive Committee is composed of the Ministry of Transport of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), Ministry of Finance of the PRC, Ministry of Agriculture of the PRC, Ministry of 
Environmental Protection of the PRC, State Oceanic Administration of the PRC, China National 
Tourism Administration, China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation 
(Sinopec Group), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). 
 114. Maritime Bureau, supra note 11. 
 115. The nine units include six administrative organs of the People’s Republic of China: Ministry of 
Transport, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Environmental Protection, State 
Oceanic Administration, National Tourism Administration, and three oil receivers: National Petroleum 
Corporation, China Sinopec, China National Offshore Oil Corporation. See China Launched a New Ship 
Oil Pollution Damage Compensation Mechanism, SHANDONG PROVINCE DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION PORT AUTHORITY, http://sdsghj.com/ghwwmh/index/info/infoDetail.jsp?messageId=
000043000228&directoryId=000043 [https://perma.cc/R6WG-HBAT]. 
 116. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-
Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the 
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), art. 17. 
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0.3 CNY (0.05 USD)117 per ton of persistent oil products from oil receivers or their 
agents.118 From July 1, 2012 to May 30, 2015, approximately 1,660 million CNY 
(25 million USD) was levied, which could compensate fourteen oil spill accidents, 
as estimated and calculated by the Chinese government.119 Because the domestic 
fund is in an early stage of operation, compensation associated with certain criteria 
is much lower than for the IOPC Funds; the highest compensation amount for each 
accident is only 30 million CNY (4.5 million USD).120 In July 2016, two Claims 
Guidelines121 were issued for claimants and specific claims work, respectively.122 
By offering detailed procedures for claiming funds, the Guidelines may improve 
fairness and efficiency in compensating ship-source oil pollution damage; however, 
these Claims Guidelines are not considered to be the legal basis for claiming funds 
when a court hears specific cases. 
D. Liability and Compensation for Offshore Oil Spill Accidents in China 
In attempting to create working definitions for offshore installations, both 
the Chinese Maritime Code and 2011 Judicial Interpretation incorporate “offshore 
mobile units” into the definition of “ships.”123 This indicates that not only sea-
going vessels, but also sea-mobile units such as floating drilling platforms, 
hovercrafts, and seaplanes may trigger application of the liability rules for ship-
source oil pollution. However, major offshore accidents usually occur on fixed 
drilling platforms, but China lacks the relevant liability and compensation and the 
ship-source oil pollution regime cannot be applied. 
Domestic legislation covering civil liability for offshore oil spill accidents 
is scarce. However, a fundamental Chinese regulation concerning pollution damage 
in the MEPL provides: 
 
 117. This exchange rate is as of February 1, 2017, from the statistics of China State Administration 
of Foreign Exchange, 1CNY=1US$0.1459). See Central Parity of RMB Exchange Rate, STATE ADMIN. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE, http://www.safe.gov.cn/wps/portal/sy/tjsj_hlzjj_inquire [https://perma.cc/997W-
S25Q]. 
 118. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-
Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the 
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), arts. 17, 6. 
 119. See Maritime Bureau, supra note 11. 
 120. Administrative Measures for the Collection and Use of Compensation Funds for Vessel-
Induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin. and the Ministry of Transp. of the 
People’s Republic of China, May 11, 2012, effective July 1, 2012), arts. 17, 18. 
 121. Claim Guidelines of Compensation Funds for Vessel-Induced Oil Pollution Damage (Trial 
Version) (promulgated by the Mar, Safety Admin. of the Ministry of Transp. of the People’s Republic of 
China, July 2016) (applied to accidents having occurred since the July 1, 2012). 
 122. MINISTRY TRANSP. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, SHIP OIL POLLUTION COMPENSATION FUND 
CLAIMS MORE CONVENIENT CLAIMS MORE TRANSPARENT (2016), http://www.moc.gov.cn/jiaotongyao
wen/201606/t20160617_2045189.html [https://perma.cc/YH37-6FBK]. 
 123. See Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 28th Meeting of the 
Standing Committee of the Seventh Nat’l People’s Congr., Nov. 7, 1992, effective July 1, 1993), art. 3; 
see also Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Cases of 
Disputes over Compensation for Vessel-induced Oil Pollution Damage (promulgated by the 1509th 
meeting of the Judicial Comm. of the Supr. People’s Ct., May 4, 2011, effective July 1, 2011), art. 31.1. 
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Any party that is directly responsible for a pollution damage to 
the marine environment shall relieve the damage and compensate 
for the losses; in case the pollution damage to the marine 
environment is entirely caused by an intentional act or a fault of a 
third party, that third party shall relieve the damage and be liable 
for the compensation.124 
Accordingly, a polluter is subjected to fault-based liability for marine oil 
pollution, and there is no limitation of liability for the pollution damage. While the 
Tort Law establishes strict liability for environmental pollution “[w]here any harm 
is caused by environmental pollution for the fault of a third party, the victim may 
require a compensation from either the polluter or the third party. After making 
compensation, the polluter shall be entitled to be reimbursed by the third party.”125 
This state of the law presumably creates a conflict in laws, i.e., that offshore oil 
spill damage could trigger either fault-based liability or strict liability. Moreover, 
the MEPL and the Tort Law do not specifically define “polluter” and “responsible 
party,” which leads to ambiguity regarding who is subject to liability for oil spills. 
Like ship owners, each enterprise, institution, or operator of an offshore 
oil and gas installation registered in China is also required to carry insurance or 
other financial guaranties with respect to liabilities for pollution damage. 126 
However, under the Chinese regime, there is no funding mechanism to supplement 
compensation for pollution from offshore operations.127 The domestic Chinese oil 
pollution fund currently only provides compensation for ship-source oil spills, 
which, together with the IOPC Funds, cannot be applied to offshore oil spill 
damage. 
Due to the lack of a unified liability and compensation criteria for offshore 
accidents, oil pollution from offshore operations in China is more likely to be 
compensated through administrative mediation, as opposed to civil litigation.128 
According to the MEPL, the State Oceanic Administration of PRC (OSA) is 
responsible for “the supervision and control over the marine environment, organize 
survey, surveillance, supervision, assessment and scientific research of the marine 
environment” and “the nation-wide environment protection work in preventing and 
controlling marine pollution damages caused by marine construction projects and 
dumping of wastes in the sea.” 129  The OSA is also in charge of claiming 
 
 124. See Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), 
art. 90. 
 125. See Tort Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 26 2009, effective July 1, 2010), art. 68. 
 126. Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Environmental 
Protection for Offshore Oil Exploration and Exploitation (promulgated by the State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, Dec. 29, 1983, effective Dec, 29, 1983), art. 9. 
 127. Lina Zhang, Comparative Study on Compulsory Insurance of Oil Pollution by Marine Oil 
Development and by Ships, 149 J. HENAN U. ECON. & L. 31, 35 (2015). 
 128. Hui Wang & Wei Zhao, Probe on Tort Liability for the Pollution Damage from Offshore Oil 
and Gas Operations, 215 J. STUDY & EXPLORATION 60, 61 (2013). 
 129. See Marine Environmental Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, rev’d Dec. 25, 1999, effective Apr. 1, 2000), 
art. 5. 
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entitlement to compensation, on behalf of the State of China, from polluters for oil 
spill damage.130 Further, the MEPL provides a maximum fine of 200,000 CNY 
(approximately 29,000 USD) per marine environmental accident, 131  which is 
extremely inadequate for offshore oil spill accidents. In addition, the MEPL 
imposes criminal liability on responsible parties for “any accident that causes major 
marine environment pollution and results thus in grave consequences of heavy 
losses in public and private properties or in injury and death of persons.” 132 
Offenses such as “Negligently Causing Serious Accident Crime” and “Taking Risk 
Work Crime” in the Criminal Law of PRC 133  can be charged against parties 
responsible for offshore oil spill damage.134 However, although responsible parties 
may face criminal punishment, criminal law only been implemented in a few 
instances to deal with oil pollution caused by offshore oil and gas operations.135 
CONCLUSION 
The international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution 
consists of a series of IMO Civil Liability and Fund conventions. The regime 
operates stably and effectively in compensating ship-source oil pollution, but does 
not address pollution damage caused by offshore operations. Some private laws and 
regional agreements have provided liability and compensation mechanisms for 
offshore pollution damage. However, different state regimes have different criteria 
concerning the definitions of offshore installations, limitation of liability, 
compulsory insurance, as well as additional funds. With offshore drilling activities 
on the rise worldwide and increasingly moving into deeper seas, it is increasingly 
necessary for the world community to establish a unified regime for assigning 
liability and providing compensation to injured parties as a result of offshore oil 
spill damage, especially for the countries lacking domestic compensation 
mechanisms for these accidents. 
China is experiencing a transitional phase of improving liability and 
compensation for oil pollution. In the face of ship-source oil pollution, China has 
fully implemented the 1992 CLC and Bunker Convention, and established 
domestic liability and fund rules as a supplementary regime. The combined system 
provides two tiers of compensation for oil pollution. However, compensation under 
China’s domestic liability-fund regime is potentially much lower than the 
compensation available under international civil liability conventions. For oil 
pollution from offshore operations, Chinese law only offers general rules on 
liability and compensation that are fragmented and contain internal conflicts in 
terms of definitions and the scope of liability for oil and gas installation owners and 
 
 130. See id. art. 90. 
 131. See id. art. 91. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 12th Nat’l People’s 
Congr. of the People’s Republic of China, Aug. 29, 2015, effective Nov. 1, 2015), Amendment IX; The 
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated by Standing Comm. of the 5th Nat’l 
People’s Congr., July 1, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980). 
 134. Wang & Zhao, supra note 128, at 63. 
 135. Id. 
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operators. Overall, a liability-fund regime for ship-source oil pollution with a 
higher ceiling of compensation is urgently needed in China. And such a fund 
should establish criteria for compensation not less than the criteria for the 1992 
CLC–IOPC Funds. 
As the financial capability of Chinese ship owners improves, China should 
endeavor to fully implement the 1992 IOPC Funds regime, which requires certain 
monetary contributions from any qualified oil receivers136 of member states, but 
offers more comprehensive compensation for serious oil spill accidents. In 
addition, the Chinese domestic liability-fund regime for oil pollution must be 
extended to the pollution damage caused by offshore accidents. Finally, a fully 
actualized, unified liability and compensation regime in China—that provides for 
compensation for offshore accidents—will also almost certainly include binding 
liability and compensation criteria, as well as safety regulations for offshore 
extractive activities worldwide. 
 
 136. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
